A rights management approach to securing data distribution in coalitions by Salim, Farzad et al.
 
 
 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
This is the accepted version of this article. To be published as : 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Catalogue from Homo Faber 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
Salim, Farzad and Sheppard, Nicholas P. and Safavi-Naini, Rei (2010) A rights 
management approach to securing data distribution in coalitions. In: 1st 
Asia-Pacific Workshop on Cyber Security, 1-3 September 2010, Melbourne. 
           
Copyright 2010 [please consult the authors] 
A Rights Management Approach to Securing Data
Distribution in Coalitions
Farzad Salim
Information Security Institute
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
E-mail: farzad@isi.qut.edu.au
Nicholas Paul Sheppard
Library eServices
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
E-mail: nicholas.sheppard@ieee.org
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
Department of Computer Science
University of Calgary
Calgary, Canada
E-mail: rei@ucalgary.ca
Abstract—As network capacity has increased over the past
decade, individuals and organisations have found it increasingly
appealling to make use of remote services in the form of
service-oriented architectures and cloud computing services. Data
processed by remote services, however, is no longer under the
direct control of the individual or organisation that provided the
data, leaving data owners at risk of data theft or misuse. This
paper describes a model by which data owners can control the
distribution and use of their data throughout a dynamic coalition
of service providers using digital rights management technology.
Our model allows a data owner to establish the trustworthiness
of every member of a coalition employed to process data, and to
communicate a machine-enforceable usage policy to every such
member.
Index Terms—service-oriented architecture, cloud computing,
digital rights management
I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial increases in the availability and capacity of
computer networks over the past decade have fuelled interest
in remote services from both individuals and organisations.
High capacity, always-on network connections make it feasible
for computer users to access remote services that perform
specialised tasks that cannot be performed by local computing
devices, or even replace general computing functions that were
previously carried out on local devices.
Service-oriented architectures, which allow a complex sys-
tem to be built from a loosely-coupled set of well-defined
services, emerged in the middle of the past decade. Cloud
computing followed towards the end of decade, allowing
service providers to offer general-purpose computing resources
on the network. This paper will use the term coalition to refer
to an arbitrary collection of services and computing resources
that has come together in order to provide some complex
service to a client.
Sensitive data submitted to such coalitions, however, is no
longer under the direct control of the individual or organisation
that provided it. Such data may be exposed to and mis-used by
dishonest services or dishonest employees of service providers.
The risk to the confidentiality and integrity of information in
cloud computing services, for example, is frequently cited as
a significant barrier to the adoption of such services [2].
This paper proposes a model by which a client may make
use of the services of a coalition, while maintaining control
over the distribution and use of any data submitted to the coali-
tion. The model draws heavily on digital rights management,
which allows data owners to control the distribution and use of
their data by associating it with a machine-enforceable licence
[5]. Digital rights management was originally developed to
control the distribution of copyrighted multimedia files, but
can perform similar functions for private personal information
and sensitive corporate information. The model presented in
the present paper is agnostic as to why a data owner might
want to control the use and distribution of data.
Section II of the present paper describes our model of a
coalition. Section III then describes a model by which a data
owner can control the distribution and use of data throughout
a coalition, and Section IV describes how the model can
be implemented using digital rights management techniques
and the eXtensible Rights Markup Language (“XrML”) [3].
Section V discusses the security properties of our model.
Section VI discusses some limitations of the basic model
proposed in Section IV, and outlines some techniques by
which the basic model can be made more flexible. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper with a summary of its major
observations, and some suggestions for future work.
II. COALITIONS
We will use the term coalition to refer to a collection of
data processors that, taken together, perform a service for a
client. We use the term data processor with a similar meaning
to that used in the European Union’s Data Protection Directive
(Directive 95/46/EC), though we do not restrict our model to
implementing that legislation, or even privacy applications in
general. We simply mean a legal entity, typically an organi-
sation, that somehow processes data (originally) provided by
the client of the coalition.
Our model is agnostic as to the legal or business methods
by which coalitions are formed, governed, and disbanded: a
coalition may be a more or less permanent entity governed by
long-lived formal agreement between the coalition members,
or an ephemeral entity created by ad hoc selection of partner
organisations to perform a particular sub-task, or some com-
bination of the two.
Following the digital rights management model, the security
of our model depends on the trustworthiness of individual
computing devices within the coalition. In this sense we will
refer to such devices as being the security principals of our
system. Section III of the present paper describes a model by
which the client of a coalition can establish trust in a particular
security principal, and communicate a usage policy to it.
Security policies in our model are written in terms of the
right of a particular security principal (that is, computing
device) to perform a particular action on a particular item of
data. A typical coalition may contain human staff in addition
to computing devices, but, in the basic version of our model,
it is only possible for security policies to refer to human staff
by using their computing devices as a proxy. Section VI-3
discusses extensions by which security policies can refer to
human staff directly.
We require that the data owner initiate contact with the
coalition through a broker, itself a data processor, who he or
she trusts to recommend coalition members. The broker may
operate a front-end web site on behalf of a long-lived coalition,
for example, or be a broker in the conventional sense who
selects back-end service providers on a case-by-case basis.
We suppose that each data processor (including the broker)
is itself composed of an arbitrary number of such security
principals that perform the actual processing for which that
data processor is employed, and that every data processor
contains exactly one (process) controller that is responsible
for assigning tasks to individual computing devices within the
data processor. We require the controller of a data processor
to vouch for the trustworthiness of the individual security
principals within that processor.
The broker may grow the coalition by selecting data pro-
cessors to carry out particular tasks on behalf of the coalition.
We assume that the broker chooses data processors according
to some appropriate policy that is outside the scope of the
present discussion, but we require the broker to vouch for the
trustworthiness of any data processor that it invites into the
coalition. Once appointed to the coalition, a data processor
may similarly invite further data processors into the coalition.
In the basic version of our model, any data processors (includ-
ing the broker) may invite any other data processor into the
coalition without restriction. Section VI-1, however, discusses
extensions by which the original data owner can control the
growth of the coalition.
III. SECURING DATA DISTRIBUTION IN COALITIONS
Cloud computing and service-oriented architectures give
rise to numerous security issues; Chow et al. [1] and Kauf-
man [4], for example, provide recent surveys. This paper is
primarily concerned with what Chow et al. call third-party
data control, that is, legal and other concerns arising from
the fact that data is stored and processed by a cloud service
provider rather than the original data owner. We assume that
traditional security and availability concerns can be tackled
by traditional means, or, at least, by revised versions of such
means that are outside the scope of the present paper.
We assume that for every item of data submitted to a
coalition, there exists a unique data owner who controls all
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Fig. 1. Licensing data to a coalition.
of the rights to distribute and use that data. In practice, data
owners’ control will be limited by what it is possible to express
in the language used for writing security policies. We are
interested in how such a data owner can go about enforcing
his or her policies throughout the coalition.
Digital rights management provides just such a framework.
Digital rights management allows data to be distributed in a
protected form such that it is accessible only according to the
terms and conditions set out in a document called a licence.
The data owner can write licences that describe who may
access his or her data, what operations they are permitted to
perform on it, and the conditions under which they may do
so.
The trivial approach to rights management in a coalition
would be to have the original data owner write licences that
directly express which security principals inside which data
processors may perform which actions on which information.
This approach, however, is unlikely to be practical, since:
• the data owner may not know in advance which data
processors will ultimately participate in the coalition, or
why it should trust them with his or her data;
• the data owner will not usually know the identities of the
individual security principals within data processors; and
• the data owner may not know the reasons for which any
particular data processor or security principal requires
access to the information.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the model proposed in the
present paper, which we argue eliminates all of the above
limitations. The model employs several levels of licensing,
such that the licence issuer at each level can be expected to
be acquainted with the security principals at the next level, and
every licence issuer can vouch for the trustworthiness of the
security principals below it. Furthermore, the organisation at
each level can sub-divide tasks for delegation to organisations
at the next level.
We require that the data owner control a licence issuer,
referred to as the original licence issuer throughout this paper,
that is able to issue (that is, create and sign) licences in the
format used by the system. This licence issuer may be a piece
of software executed on a machine operated by the data owner,
Process Controller
✲1a. encrypted
data
✲1b. delegation
licence
✻
2.
de
le
ga
tio
n
lic
en
ce
❄3
.d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
lic
en
ce
Security
Principal
❄4
a.
en
cr
yp
te
d
da
ta
❄
4b
us
ag
e
lic
en
ce
... Security
Principal
❄4
a.
en
cr
yp
te
d
da
ta
❄
4b
.u
sa
ge
lic
en
ce
Fig. 2. Licensing data within a data processor.
or it may be a service provided by some external organisation
trusted by the data owner. The original licence issuer acts as
the root authority for all licences that refer to items of data
created by its data owner, and must have access to the keys
(Step 0) that the data owner uses to encrypt data.
Upon requesting a service provided by a coalition, the data
owner transmits his or her data to the broker in an encrypted
form (Step 1a). Instead of directly authorising the broker to
operate on the information, however, the data owner transmits
the encryption key to his or her licence issuer, and causes it
to issue a delegation licence to the process controller of the
broker (Step 1b).
The delegation licence does not authorise the broker to ac-
cess the protected information directly, but is used something
like a trust certificate in trust management systems. In our
model, possession of a valid delegation licence indicates that
the possessor is trusted by the issuer to perform some task
delegated to the possessor by the issuer.
Initially, we suppose that the data owner trusts the process
controller of the broker to perform the task. The processor
controller of the broker, however, may identify other data
processors that it trusts to carry out parts of the task, and may
issue a second delegation licence to the controllers of these
data processors (Step 2b). In general, these process controllers
may themselves issue further delegation licences to further
data processors that they trust to perform further sub-tasks.
In order to obtain permission to access data, a process con-
troller must present a valid delegation licence to the original
licence issuer (Step 3). If the original licence issuer is satisfied
that the delegation licence is valid, it will issue a distribution
licence (so called because it resembles licences used in multi-
tier distribution systems) to the process controller (Step 4).
A distribution licence authorises the controller of a data
processor to issue (“distribute”) usage licences to individual
security principals within its organisation, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. Usage licences authorise the security principals to do
the actual work to be done by that data processor.
In this way, the original licence issuer may verify the
trustworthiness of the process controller of the broker using
some direct means outside the scope of the present paper.
The process controller of the broker can similarly verify the
trustworthiness of the controllers of other data processors,
while the original licence issuer may verify their trustwor-
thiness indirectly by inspecting their delegation licences. The
process controller of each data processor can similarly verify
the trustworthiness of the individual security principals within
its organisation, and ensure that usage licences are issued
only to security principals that it trusts to comply with the
polices expressed in these licences. In the next section, we will
describe how this model can be implemented in a digital rights
management system based on the eXtensible Rights Markup
Language.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION USING THE EXTENSIBLE RIGHTS
MARKUP LANGUAGE
We will illustrate our model using the eXtensible Rights
Markup Language (“XrML”) [3] to express licences. XrML
is an XML-based rights expression language promulgated by
ContentGuard and adopted, with some modifications, by the
Motion Picture Experts Group as ISO/IEC 21000-5. This paper
follows the XrML Version 2.0 specification.
XrML is defined in a collection of three XML schemata
known as the core schema (denoted by the namespace prefix r
in this paper), the standard extension schema (prefix sx) and
the content extension schema (prefix cx). The core schema
defines the fundamental elements of the language, and will
be described presently. The two extension schemata define a
large number of rights, resources, and conditions for use in a
wide variety of scenarios, and we will introduce elements of
these schemata as necessary throughout the paper.
An XrML licence is an XML document rooted at the
r:license element. Each licence consists of one or more
r:grant elements, each of which grants some right over
some resource to some principal. Each grant may be subject
to some condition that restricts the circumstances in which the
grant may be exercised.
Every licence must also contain an r:issuer element that
identifies the entity that issued the licence, and contains the
signature of that entity on the licence. We assume that the
coalition has selected some suitable secure digital signature
scheme for this purpose, and will not consider the details of
any particular scheme in this paper. The licence is valid only
if the issuer’s signature is valid, and the issuer has the right to
issue that licence. The method by which a security principal
verifies that a licence issuer has the right to issue a particular
licence varies from system to system, and we will describe
particular methods for our system in what follows.
A. Data Encryption
Throughout this paper, we require that the data owner
encrypt every item of data (that is, resource of an XrML
licence) using a unique random data encryption key. We
assume that the coalition has selected some suitable symmetric
encryption algorithm for this purpose, and will not consider
the details of any particular algorithm.
In order to exercise a right on a resource, a security principal
in possession of a licence that permits it to exercise some right
on some item of data must also obtain the data encryption key
for that item. In this paper, we will use the licences themselves
to transmit data encryption keys to the principals that need
them, using a scheme similar to the one used in the “SITDRM”
system developed by Sheppard, et al. [7].
In addition to all of the usual elements of an XrML grant,
grants in this paper may contain an xenc:EncryptedKey
element, where the xenc prefix represents the XML Encryp-
tion namespace defined by the XML Security Working Group
[9]. This element will contain the data encryption key for the
resource of the licence, itself encrypted by the public key of
the principal of the licence, using the format defined for doing
so in the XML Encryption specification. Using this scheme,
the principal of a grant (and only this principal) will be able
to use its private key and the grant itself to extract the data
encryption key required to exercise the right of the grant.
B. Data Ownership
We require that security principals accept a licence for an
item of data only if that licence was authorised, directly or
indirectly, by the licence issuer controlled by the original
owner of the data that the licence refers to. We therefore
require that licences and encrypted data carry information
necessary for an arbitrary security principal to verify that a
licence has been properly authorised by the owner of the
data to which it refers. This could be done by introducing
a trusted registrar who maintains a mapping of data items to
data owners, but we can eliminate the need for such a registrar
by introducing a special signature scheme for licences.
We require a signature scheme such that only the party who
possesses the data encryption key for an item data can create
a valid signature on a licence that refers to this data. Sheppard
and Safavi-Naini describe one such scheme, in which the data
owner inserts a unique random nonce into both the encrypted
data and the signature on a licence for it [8]. A security
principal in possession of an encrypted data item and a licence
bearing such a signature can check that the encrypted data and
the licence were created by the same person by comparing the
nonce in each.
We will refer to a signature scheme with this property as
an ownership signature scheme, and will use such a scheme
to ensure that participants can create valid licences only for
data for which they possess the data encryption key.
C. Delegation
Figure 3 shows a root delegation licence issued by the
original licence issuer. It contains a single grant (called the
outer grant) that authorises its principal to obtain another grant
(called the inner grant) given as the resource of the outer grant.
The inner grant describes a distribution licence, which will be
described in more detail in Section IV-D.
The r:delegationControl element allows the prin-
cipal of the delegation licence to issue a new licence con-
taining a new grant with the same right and resource as the
<r:license>
<r:grant>
<!-- this grant my be delegated -->
<r:delegationControl/>
<!-- principal: the process controller of the broker -->
<r:keyHolder>...</r:keyHolder>
<!-- right: to obtain the resource -->
<r:obtain/>
<!-- resource: the grant of the distribution licence -->
<r:grant>
See Fig. 4
</r:grant>
</r:grant>
<r:issuer>
<!-- the signature of the original licence issuer -->
<ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature>
</r:issuer>
</r:license>
Fig. 3. A root delegation licence.
original grant, but with a different principal. The original
licence issuer may restrict delegation in various ways by
specifying constraints within the r:delegationControl
element, but we will defer discussion of these constraints until
Section VI-1. For the moment, we assume that the principal
of a delegation licence will simply choose the controller of a
data processor that it trusts.
The principal of the root delegation licence must be the
process controller of the broker, that is, the r:keyHolder
element must contain the public key of the broker’s controller.
The issuer of the licence is the original licence issuer. Future
delegation licences, created by use of the r:delegation-
Control element, may have other principals and issuers
according to the procedure described below.
A principal in possession of a valid delegation licence may
delegate the licence to another member of the coalition, or it
may exercise the r:obtain right to acquire a distribution
licence for itself. We will describe each procedure presently.
1) Delegation: The controller of every data processor ap-
pointed to the coalition must possess a chain of delegation
licences of which it is the principal of the last licence in the
chain. The first licence must be the root delegation licence
issued by the original licence issuer, and every intermediate
licence must be issued by the principal of the licence imme-
diately prior to it in the chain.
In order to appoint a new (“downstream”) data processor
to the coalition, the controller of an upstream data processor
must extend the chain of delegation licences. We require that
the upstream process controller possess a trusted copy of
the downstream process controller’s public key, and use it to
extend the chain as follows:
1) Make a copy of the final licence in the chain.
2) Replace the r:keyHolder element with a similar
element containing the public key of the downstream
process controller.
3) Replace the ds:Signature element with a similar
signature created using the private key of the upstream
process controller.
4) Append the new licence to the chain.
The upstream process controller must then transmit the chain
and the encrypted data to the downstream process controller.
2) Obtaining a distribution licence: A process controller in
possession of a chain of delegation licences may apply for a
distribution licence by extracting the identity of the original
licence issuer from the first licence in the chain, and submitting
the chain to this original licence issuer. The original licence
issuer must verify the chain of delegation licences as follows:
1) Verify that the first licence in chain is correctly signed
by itself.
2) Verify that every intermediate licence in the chain is
• correctly formed according to the r:delega-
tionControl element of the licence that pre-
cedes it in the chain; and
• correctly signed under the public key contained
in the r:keyHolder element of the licence that
precedes it in the chain.
If the original licence issuer is satisfied that the chain is cor-
rectly formed, it may issue a distribution licence as described
in Section IV-D.
Even if the chain of delegation licences is correct, the orig-
inal licence issuer is still free to refuse to issue a distribution
licence if it is not satisfied with the data processor for some
reason. The coalition may be able to replace the rejected
data processor using the same mechanism by which that data
processor was selected in the first place, but this mechanism
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
D. Distribution
Figure 4 shows a distribution licence. Its outer grant au-
thorises its principal (the controller of a data processor who
obtained the licence according to the procedure described in
Section IV-C) to issue a new licence that contains the inner
grant. The inner grant describes a usage licence, which we
will discuss in more detail in Section IV-E.
The r:forAll element declares a variable whose value
may be chosen by the principal of the licence. In Figure 4,
the original licence issuer has declared a variable x that the
controller of a data processor may replace with the public
key of one of the security principals within its organisation.
The r:forAll element allows the original licence issuer to
authorise the issue of usage licences without direct knowledge
of the public keys of the security principals to whom such
licences are to be issued. The original licence issuer may
restrict the range of values that the process controller may use
for x by defining XML patterns to which it must conform, but
will defer discussion of this until Section VI-2. For the present,
we will assume that the process controller will only issue
licences to security principals that it trusts to obey licences.
1) Creating distribution licences: The controller of a data
processor may request the creation of a distribution licence
by presenting a chain of delegation licences to the original
licence issuer as described in Section IV-D. If the original
licence issuer is satisfied with the request, it may create a new
distribution licence as follows:
<r:license>
<r:grant>
<!-- for all x -->
<forAll varName="x"/>
<!-- principal: the controller of the data processor -->
<r:keyHolder>...</r:keyHolder>
<!-- right: to issue the grant below -->
<r:issue/>
<!-- resource: the grant of the usage licence -->
<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder varRef="x"/>
See Fig. 5
</r:grant>
<!-- the (encrypted) data encryption key -->
<xenc:EncryptedKey>...</xenc:EncryptedKey>
</r:grant>
<!-- the ownership signature of the original licence issuer -->
<r:issuer>
<ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature>
</r:issuer>
</r:license>
Fig. 4. A distribution licence.
1) Make a copy of the inner grant of the final delegation
licence in the chain, and insert it into a new licence.
2) Extract the public key of the process controller from the
r:keyHolder element of the final delegation licence
and insert it into the new licence.
3) Use this key to encrypt the data encryption key for the
data to which the licence refers.
4) Insert this encrypted key into an xenc:Encrypted-
Key element in the grant of the new licence.
5) Create an ownership signature for this licence and data
item, and insert it into the new licence.
The original licence issuer may then transmit the new distri-
bution licence to the process controller that requested it.
2) Issuing usage licences: Being in possession of the
protected data and a distribution licence for it, a process
controller may choose individual principals within the data
processor to perform the actual work. We require that the
process controller possess a trusted copy of the public key
for any security principal to which it wishes assign licences.
It may then issue a usage licence to a chosen principal as
follows:
1) Verify the ownership signature on the distribution li-
cence.
2) Make a copy of the inner grant of the distribution
licence.
3) Replace the variable x in the grant with an r:key-
Holder element containing the public key of the cho-
sen principal.
4) Use its own private key to decrypt the data encryption
key in the xenc:EncryptedKey element of the outer
grant.
5) Re-encrypt the data encryption key using the public key
of the chosen principal.
6) Insert this encrypted key into an xenc:Encrypted-
Key element in the grant of the new licence.
7) Create a signature for the licence under its own private
key, and insert this signature into the licence.
<r:license>
<r:grant>
<!-- principal: the machine that will do the actual work -->
<r:keyHolder>...</r:keyHolder>
<!-- right: to play (view) the resource -->
<cx:play/>
<!-- resource: the data item -->
<r:digitalWork>
<r:secureIndirect URI="...">
...
</secureIndirect>
</r:digitalWork>
<!-- the (encrypted) data encryption key -->
<xenc:EncryptedKey>...</xenc:EncryptedKey>
</r:grant>
<!-- the signature of the data controller of the processor -->
<r:issuer>
<ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature>
</r:issuer>
</r:license>
Fig. 5. A usage licence.
The process controller may then transmit the encrypted data
along with the new usage licence to the chosen security
principal.
E. Usage
Figure 5 shows a usage licence created by a process
controller following the procedure described in the previ-
ous sub-section. The principal of the licence is a security
principal identified by its public key, and its resource is
the protected data described by an r:digitalResource
element. The r:digitalResource element itself refers
to the encrypted data item (which is external to the licence)
using an r:secureIndirect element that conforms to
the dsig:ReferenceType type of the XML Signature
Specification.
In this example, the usage licence grants the cx:play
right, but the original licence issuer can also grant rights
such as cx:print, cx:extract and many others. We
assume that that the original licence issuer establishes which
rights it needs to give to the coalition as part of its initial
communication with the broker.
A security principal in possession of usage licence, and a
trusted copy of the public key of the process controller of its
organisation, may exercise the right granted by the licence as
follows:
1) Verify that the r:keyHolder element of the licence
contains the principal’s own public key.
2) Verify that the licence is correctly signed by the con-
troller of the data processor to which the principal
belongs.
3) Verify that any conditions in the licence are satisfied
according to the definition of those conditions in the
XrML specification (the licence shown in Figure 5,
however, does not have any conditions).
4) Decrypt the data encryption key in the licence using the
principal’s own private key.
5) Decrypt the data item using the decrypted data encryp-
tion key.
The principal may then perform the desired action on the
unencrypted data.
F. Example
Suppose that Alice, who lives in Australia, wishes to holiday
in Greece, visiting several cities while she is there. Alice may
approach a travel agent in Australia to organise her transport
and accomodation. The travel agent does not operate its own
airline or hotels, so it must obtain these services from other
organisations on Alice’s behalf.
In our model, Alice is a data owner and the travel agent
is the broker of an ad hoc coalition of transport and acco-
modation providers that is created on-demand to serve Alice’s
request for a holiday. Each transport or accomodation provider
is a data processor in our model, and may require items such as
Alice’s address, passport number and credit card information
in order to provide the service that Alice desires. Alice,
however, does not want any of these items to be distributed
beyond the coalition or to be used for any purpose other than
serving her request.
For simplicity, we will suppose that Alice creates a single
document that contains all of the information necessary to
obtain the service that she wants. In a real scenario, she may
want to prepare several different documents to be used for
several different purposes, but each such document will be
treated similarly to the one described here.
Having put the necessary information into an electronic
document, Alice chooses a random data encryption key and
encrypts the document with this key. She then asks her licence
issuer to create a delegation licence whose principal is the
process controller of the travel agent, and whose resource
is the newly-created document. Alice transmits the encrypted
document and the licence to the travel agent.
The travel agent may then select an airline who will fly
Alice from Australia to Greece. It must transmit Alice’s
encrypted information to the airline, and the process controller
of the travel agent must use the root delegation licence to issue
a second delegation licence to the process controller of the
airline.
The process controller of the airline may assign the travel
agent’s request to a flight booking service hosted on a machine
within the airline. The airline’s process controller must use
the delegation licence to request a distribution licence from
Alice’s licence issuer. Alice’s licence issuer verifies that the
delegation licence has been correctly delegated, and, if so,
issues a distribution licence to the airline’s process controller.
The airline’s process controller may now use the distribution
licence to issue a usage licence to the machine (which is a
security principal) that executes the flight booking service. It
uses its private key to extract Alice’s data encryption key from
the distribution licence, re-encrypts the key with the public key
of the security principal to which the licence will be issued,
and issues the new licence under its own signature.
Finally, the booking machine must verify that the licence
it has received was issued by the process controller of its
own organisation (that is, the airline). If the licence is valid,
the machine may use its own private key to extract the data
encryption key from the usage licence, decrypt the document,
and permit the flight booking service to book the flight using
this information.
The travel agent may similarly select an accomodation
provider in Greece and create a delegation licence for its
process controller. This process controller may issue further
delegation licences to process controllers of individual hotels
on Alice’s route. Finally, each such process controller may
request distribution licences and assign usage to individual
security principals within the hotel, as for the airline.
V. SECURITY
We desire that the data owner’s information only be used as
directed by the data owner in the innermost grant of the root
delegation licence, and only by security principals who have
been authenticated by the controller of a data processor, who
itself lies in a chain of appointments rooted at the coalition
broker. Throughout this section, we assume that the encryption
and signature schemes used are secure according to the usual
requirements for such schemes.
We require that an attacker be unable to observe or interfere
with the inner workings of security principals (including pro-
cess controllers) who have been authenticated as trustworthy
by the broker, or another process controller in the chain of
appointments rooted at the coalition broker. That is, we require
process controllers to accept security principals as trustworthy
only if they cannot be manipulated by attackers. Digital rights
management systems typically address these requirements
using trusted computing technology; see, for example, [6]. An
attacker may, however, observe and modify any licences or
data transmitted over the network, and may inject new licences
or data into the inputs of a process controller or security
principal.
We require the data owner and original licence issuer to
encrypt the data using a unique random data encryption key,
so that the data is only accessible to an entity that possesses
this key. We further require that the original licence issuer
only distribute the data encryption key as part of a distribu-
tion licence created according to the procedure described in
Section IV-D.
We require that such distribution licences be issued only to
process controllers who can demonstrate a chain of delegation
licences rooted at the root delegation licence, and ending
with a delegation licence issued to the process controller who
requests the distribution licence. It is easy to see the chain of
delegation licences has the same cryptographic structure as a
chain of public key certificates, and that the original licence
issuer can therefore verify that the process controller has been
correctly appointed using the same algorithms as those used
for verifying certificate chains.
We require that a process controller only accept a distribu-
tion licence if it bears a correctly-formed ownership signature
for the data in the resource to which it refers. Since only the
original data owner and licence issuer can create such a pair of
licence and item of data, a process controller will only accept
a licence if it was created by the original licence issuer of the
data to which it refers.
Since it is encrypted by the public key of the process
controller for whom it is intended, the data encryption key of
a distribution licence created by the original licence issuer can
only be decrypted by such a controller. Since such a controller
will only accept a distribution licence if it is signed by the
original licence issuer as described above and is trusted to use
the key only as directed by the licence, the key can only be
used to exercise the r:issue right.
The r:issue right permits the process controller to create
a new licence in which the data encryption key is encrypted by
the public key of a principal that the controller has verified to
be trustworthy. Since this principal will only accept a licence if
it is signed by the process controller of its organisation, and is
trusted to use the key only to exercise the grant of the usage
licence (which is the innermost grant of the root delegation
licence), the information can only be accessed according to
this grant.
VI. DISCUSSION
1) Constraining delegation: The delegation licences de-
scribed in Section IV-C authorise their principals to delegate
the licence to any other principal, allowing the coalition to
grow arbitrarily according to the whims of the process con-
trollers that come into possession of delegation licences. The
original licence can, at least in principle, control the growth
of the coalition by refusing to grant distribution licences to
would-be data processors that it does not approve of, but the
data owner may prefer to minimise the need for this by limiting
the growth of the coalition in the first place.
XrML allows the original licence issuer to control the scope
of the r:delegationControl element by including one
of several constraints within the element. The r:depth-
Constraint element can be used in a straightforward way
to limit the length of the chain of delegation licences, and
the r:toConstraint element can be used to specify the
principals to which the grant may be delegated.
2) Constraining distribution: As for delegation licences,
the distribution licences described in Section IV-D permit
process controllers to issue usage licences to any security
principal that they choose. There are at least two ways in
which the original licence issuer can restrict the behaviour of
process controllers:
• the original licence issuer can restrict the range of the
variable of the r:forAll element by defining an XPath
expression to which its values must conform; or
• the original licence issuer can insert conditions into the
outer grant of the distribution licence that restrict the
circumstances under which the process controller may
exercise the r:issue right.
3) More flexible usage licences: The usage licences de-
scribed in Section IV-E are very limited in that they can
only be used by a single security principal. This may be
sufficient if the task to which the licence refers is assigned to
a single machine within the data processor. In more complex
organisations, however, it may be desirable to assign the task
to a pool of machines capable of doing the task, or to a human
user who may use one of several machines, or to a role of a
role-based access control system.
Modern digital rights management systems support autho-
rised domains (or properties, in XrML) that may contain
multiple security principals, such that a licence can be issued
to a domain and used by all of the devices within that domain.
The controller of a data processor may therefore wish to issue
usage licences to an authorised domain within its organisation,
rather than a single security principal. This requires the organi-
sation to have some method of managing authorised domains,
and of determining which principals should be members of
which domains. We leave the design of such systems as an
exercise for the reader.
4) Derived Information: Our model considers only the
security of data directly supplied by the client of a coalition.
In general, however, data processors may create new data that
impinges upon the security or privacy of the client, and several
of the “new problems” identified by Chow et al. fall into this
category [1]. The travel agent of Section IV-F, for example,
may create an itinery that Alice wishes to keep private. XrML
permits licence issuers to control the creation of new resources
based upon earlier resources using rights such as cx:edit
and cx:embed, but does not specify what rights should exist
over any new resources so created. We leave the treatment of
data created within the coalition itself as future work.
5) Efficiency: XrML licences can be very large, and storing
and processing them may create significant overhead compared
to storing and processing unprotected data. In the example of
Section IV-F the licences may be significantly larger than the
address and credit card information that they are protecting.
We expect that the size and processing time of licences could
significantly decreased by representing them in a compact
binary format, but we leave further improvements to the
efficiency of our model as future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
Digital rights management is an obvious approach to ad-
dress third-party control of data in service-oriented architec-
tures and cloud computing environments. We have illustrated
an approach based on the eXtensible Rights Markup Language
and a cryptographic architecture similar to that used in many
digital rights management systems.
Our basic model places few restrictions on the ability of
brokers of coalitions and data processors to delegate tasks
to other data processors or computing devices. Nor does it
consider the protection of data created within the coalition
itself. XrML does provide some mechanisms by which the
data owner can restrict the behaviour of coalition members in
both of these respects, but we leave the design of such policies
as future work.
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APPENDIX
The model described in Section III of this paper con-
templates the existence of numerous data owners operating
numerous licence issuers. Without a universal licence issuer
recognised and trusted by all parties, a naı¨ve implementation
of this model may permit a dishonest licence issuer to create
apparently valid licences for items of data for which it is not,
in fact, responsible. One method is to copy the encrypted data
encrypted key from a licence created by the true licence issuer,
and insert this key into a licence signed by the forger.
Sheppard and Safavi-Naini describe one method of defeat-
ing this attack [8], in which the true licence issuer inserts a
nonce into both the encrypted data, and the signature on a
licence for it. More generally, we can define an ownership
signcryption scheme as a cryptographic scheme with the
following algorithms:
• an asymmetric key generation algorithm that outputs a
public key K and corresponding private key K¯;
• a symmetric key generation algorithm that outputs a
symmetric key k;
• a signcryption algorithm that accepts a private key K¯, a
symmetric key k, a document X , and a licence L, and
outputs an encrypted document E(k,X) and signature
S(K¯, L);
• a verification algorithm that accepts a public key K,
encrypted document X˜ and signed licence S˜, and outputs
true if and only if X˜ = E(k,X) and S˜ = S(K¯, L); and
• a decryption algorithm that accepts a symmetric key k
and an encrypted document E(k,X), and outputs X .
